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By John A. Humbach
us many rights, but
the rights are only as good as the laws'
implementation. And our legal system
undoubtedly delivers far less than its
literal promise. The recent American
Bar Foundation survey, The Legal
Needs of the Public (1977), shows that
the probability a lawyer will be consulted for various problems is as low as
12 per cent for serious problems with
bureaucracy (nonbusiness related); 10
per cent for serious consumer problems
(including landlord-tenant); 5 per cent
for serious property damage (nonbusiness related); and 1per cent for job discrimination. Two of three Americans
have consulted a lawyer only once in
their lives or never at all.
It is clear that there are many occasions when legal services would be useful but are not being provided. The
question is what the legal profession
can do and should be fairly expected to
I
do about this.
First, what can the legal profession
do about the massive differences in access to legal services? The answer, I am
afraid, is not much. President Carter
charged last year that 90 per cent of the
lawyers represent only 10 per cent of
the people (64 A.B.A.J. 840 (1978)).Our
egalitarian ethic is appalled by these
claims, but it is even more staggering to
think of what would be involved in trying to provide all of the people with the
legal services now enjoyed by the most
favorably treated 10 per cent. We already have more lawyers per capita
than any other country. If we doubled
our numbers immediately, the shortfall
O U R LAWS PROMISE

access do not show great inequality. Instead, they show that most people get
about the same level of legal
services-a level that is very low. Evidently, people who have potential legal
problems mostly manage to reach a resolution by extralegal means.
These extralegal resolutions may or
may not be parallel to or imitative of the
solutions lawyers would provide. But
that is beside the point. Unless we are
going to increase drastically the proportion of the work force engaged in
law practice, we have to reconcile ourselves to this reality: we do not want
the legal system to be capable of offering all of the protection it may seem to
promise. It will never redress every
technical battery or defamatory slight.
It will never wring every dollar due
from the social welfare system. In fact,
the entire range of supposed legal protections is subject to the following rueful but real qualification: they are available only if somebody, willingly or
unwillingly, pays the cost of providing
them.
Why must this be? Why cannot the
law's protection correspond fully to its
promise? The answer is priorities. Nobody wants to devote $500 blocks of
lawyers' time to $15 problems.
The use of lawyers by the middle
class demonstrates the point. Except for
a narrow range of property-related
matters-conveyances, wills, and marital separations - the middle class
makes just about as little use of legal
services as those who literally cannot
afford them. Even prepaid legal insurance plans have proved surprisingly
unpopular. Why? Because people do
>

Mandatory pro bono publico legal services
is a misconceived idea. Its result could be
a bonanza for the big firms.
would still be massive. A little extra pro
bono publico work by each lawyer
(even, as has been proposed by the
American Bar Association Special
Committee on Public Interest Practice,
5 to 10 per cent of a lawyer's time)
would hardly make a dent. To tout
these schemes as a response to inequality is pure public relations gimmickry.
What can we make of this? The first
thing is to avoid confusing lawyer justice with social justice. The statistics
show vast differences in access to legal
services, but what about the general
level of justice?
For one thing, the statistics on lawyer
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not want to give up what they would
have to in order to buy a little more of
our lawyer justice, except when the expected benefit is worth the cost.
People's priorities are different.
However, just because lawyers are
expensive, it does not mean that lawyer
justice is by and large reserved for the
rich. With our almost unique contingent fee system, we are the most litigious, that is, justice-seeking, society on
Earth. Contingent fees permit just about
any substantial legal claim to be pursued if getting the justice is worth the
cost. The assertion of rights defensively
is, of course, a different matter. Defense
is primarily a matter of protecting
property fro111 judicial execution. The
cost of this protection (for most of us,
liability insurance) is part of the price
of owning property. The problem of
criminal defense is somewhat special,
analogous to that of criminal prosecution. If there is going to be a criminal
justice system, there has to be some
mechanism for determining who the
criminals are. Prosecution and defense
both are parts of the mechanism. The
social interest in identifying the crirninals justifies the social burden of running the basic epistomology.
This is not to say all is perfect. To be
sure, a little more lawyer justice here
and there would even things up a bit so
far as social justice is concerned. But
occasional miscarriages of justice do
not make for an "unjust society" unless
we start mistaking ice cubes for the tips
of icebergs. We c a ~ obecome
t
frenzied
just because there is not a lawyer to
solve every legal problem. If social justice requires legal services for every
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problem that could be handled legally,
then the world will never know social
justice. 1 do not belleve, however, that
the requirements of social justiceareso
stringent.
So we cannot do much about the distribution of legal services. But a question still remains. What should lawyers, dq a profession, fairly be expected
to do in light of the maldistribution that
exists? Just because we cannot do much
does not mean we should simply do
nothing. Not only as members of the
justice profession, but as human beings, we should be sensitive to injustice. The pit of unfulfilled human need
may be practically bottomless, but thls
fact should be a stimulus, not a discouragement, to the generosity of our
charitable impulses. As professionals,
moreover, we are uniquely able to fill
needs of a particular type-legal needs
-and it should be part of our professional ethic, as well as the written
ethics, to help those who cannot pay.
But what about going beyond this?
What about mandatory pro bono publico work - a legal requirement that
lawyers must work 5 to 10 per cent of
their time on a no-fee or low-fee basis,
"quantifying" our p u b l ~ cinterest responsibility, as ~t is euphemistically
called? These proposals are, I think,
misconceived, unfair, and probably
counterproductive of their ostensible
objectives Here is why
The problem of inadequate legal
services to those who cannot pay 1s
really only part of a much larger problem-poverty The poor not only do not
get enough legal services; they tend to
have inadequate shelter, not enough
food, low-quality clothing, bad plumbing, less entertainment - in short, too
little of just about everything. That is
the definition of being poor. This raises
two important questions.
First, if the poor suffer deprivation of
all sorts, is an expanded supply of legal
services what they really want? Or are
their priorities more like those of the
middle class? That is, given the choice,
would they prefer that lawyers render
their charitv in some other form? I sus-

game, we should glve them not 5 or 10
per cent of our time but 5 or 10 per cent
of our incomes. With the money, the
poor could buy our legal servlces if that
is what they really want, or they could
use ,he money br something
-
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whichever would make them happier.
Merely to increase substantially the
quantity of free legal services is largely
to waste our time, if even the poor,
given the value, would likely think it
more worthwhile to spend it on something else.
The second question raised by mandatory pro bono publico schemes is one
of fairness. Yes, there is a maldistribution of legal services in our society. But
since this is essentially a part of a much
larger problem -the social problem of
poverty - it is illogical to saddle one
small group in soclety with a very burdensome special tax. It makes about as
much sense as taxing beauticians to
save the whales. Mandatory pro bono
publico would be nothing less than a
tax-an excise tax levied on the practice of the legal profession. Since the
problem 1s general, so should be the solution The general tax bases should be
resorted to for fairness, not to mentlon
effectiveness
A tax payable only in services, not
commutable to a cash payment, would
be particularly insidious in imposlng
what would be in effect, and perhaps in
law, an involuntary servitude. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether
that scheme would violate the letter of
the Thirteenth Amendment, but surely
lt would violate the amendment's
spirit. And to assert glibly that a lawyer
has no "right" to practice law, or can
always glve up the profession, training,
and experience, is more to demonstrate
cynicism than constitutional validity.
Then there is the Issue of competency. What happens when a lot of securitles and patent lawyers are turned
loose on the legal problems of the poor?
My guess is that there might be a lot of
malpractice. The legal problems of thc
poor are not necessarily nnsophisticated or simple. Consumer law, landlord-tenant, and social services are all
specialties, and their mastery hardly
can be accomplished by practicing
them a couple of weeks a year. If we are
going to help the poor, we should offer
them more than the diminished enthuslasm of forced labor or the seat-ofthe-pants guesswork of high-minded
poverty law dilettantes. They are entitled to lawyers who take their causes
seriously and are able to handle them as
serious cases.
What intrigues me about mandatory
pro bono publico work is the question
of c u ~bono-that is, who benefits? At
first glance the obvious beneficiaries
appear to be the poor But on reflection
it is not so obvious they will benefit

For example, suppose that lawyers,
looking for ways to fill their quota, start
impeding debt collection or complicating evictions of. nonrent-paying tenants. The immediate result is to increase the fees to the lawyers of landlords and merchants, thus increasing
the costs of those suppliers. The
longer-run effect is likely worse: to increase the price or decrease the supply
of housing and credit to the poor. It is a
great social Injustice that many .people
cannot afford decent housing. It may be
even more unjust that tenants can be
evicted for failing to pay the rent on a
tumble-down slum. But additional Inputs of lawyer justice are not likely to
solve those social problems. Indeed, if
the poor end up paying more to defend
landlords and merchants, things may
even get worse.
The most intriguing cul bono aspect
of mandatory pro bono schemes is the
different effect they could have on lawyers in different klnds of practlce.
Those in small firms and sole practitioners wlll be affected far more drastically than members of large firms.

Sole practitioners
would have trouble
paying the "tax"

burden to be shifted effectively to them.
Lawyers who will least feel the burden are those whose business is to buy
legal services wholesale and sell them
at retail. These are, of course, the members of large law firms. Since big-firm
partners do not make their money
solely by selling their own time, they
can much more reddily parry the time
burdens of mandatory pro bono publico. Already large-scale buyers and
sellers of legal services, they simply
can hire extra associates, let thein do
pro bono publico work full time, and
thereby satisfy the obligations of the
firm. This "collective" approach to f~!filling a firm's pro bono publico responsibility has been endorsed by the
principal proponents of mandatory pro
bono publico work -the A.B.A. committee And as a painless escape hatch
for the highest-paid members of our
profession, the "collective" responsibility approach hardly could be excelled.
Indeed, members of large firms may
even benefit - and not only from the
implicit good public relations. There
may be cash profits as well After all,
most situations requiring legal services
have two sides. Whenever clients who
cannot pay get more legal services,
clients who can pay need more legal
services. This results in new business
for the bar. Of course, this new business
is little help to lawyers who sell only
their own time. With their own pro
bono publico duties, they would be
hard put to take on additional work,
even if it paid.
But for the buyers and sellers of legal
services, this new business could be a
small bonanza. They could hire new
associdles to do the work, pay them
wholesale, and sell their tlme retail,
and dn enlire new source of profits
could be cxploited from the increased
turnover of big-firm lawyers' stock in
trade.
What can we conclude about this
misconceived idea of mandatory pro
hono publico work for lawyers? At best,
it is an exoression of the idealism of a
profession dedicated to public service.
4 t worst, it is a public relations gimmick, designed to deflect the suspicio~l
that lawyers are basically a bulwark between iustice and the elite. At bottom,
however, it is neither of these. It is simply an idea whose tir~ieshould never
come. A

First, lawyers who practlce alone or
In small firms would be least able to
avoid the full brunt of a mandatory pro
bono publico "tax." Because these lawyers earn their llviilgs by selling only
their own time, their options would be
slight. Eithei they could devote less
time to their paying clients and thereby
reduce the11 i n ~ o m e s ,or they could
give up tlme otherwise available for
personal leisure, fanilly a~tivitles,and
the llkc Or, of course, they could try
some comblnatlon of more work and
less pay.
Another group of ldwyers iri~ludes
employees of corporations, of government, or of firms owned by other ldwyers. Mandatory pro bono publico may
have divergent effects on thern. For
example, a corporate or government
lawyer might have to satisfy
5 per
cent requircmcnt by donating two
weeks of his varation to a p u b l i ~interest law firm. Or, employer willing, the
two work weeks could orcur during
regular work time, in which case the
lawyer wolild not be burdened much at
all unless his salary were adjusted to
reflect his redured productivity. The
(John A. Humbach is a professor of
impact of a pro bono publico tax on this
group could he heavy or light, depend- law at Pace University, White Plains,
ing on whether employers allowed ~ t s New York.)
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